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Predictive codingPredictive coding has recently been welcomed as a fruitful framework to understand autism spectrum
disorder. Starting from an account centered on deficient differential weighting of prediction errors (based
in so-called precision estimation), we illustrate that individuals with autism have particular difficulties
with separating signal from noise, across different tasks. Specifically, we discuss how deficient
precision-setting is detrimental for learning in unstable environments, for context-dependent assign-
ment of salience to inputs, and for robustness in perception, as illustrated in coherent motion paradigms.
 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
As part of the wider trend in computational psychiatry (Friston,
Stephan, Montague, & Dolan, 2014; Montague, Dolan, Friston, &
Dayan, 2012; Stephan & Mathys, 2014), recent explanatory
accounts of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) take inspiration from
well-articulated information processing models of typical cogni-
tion (Hohwy, 2013; Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014; Pellicano &
Burr, 2012; Qian & Lipkin, 2011; Quattrocki & Friston, 2014;
Rosenberg, Patterson, & Angelaki, 2015; Sinha et al., 2014; Van
de Cruys et al., 2014). Particularly influential in most of these
new proposals for ASD is the predictive coding framework (Clark,
2013; Friston, 2010). Predictive coding assumes that the brain
builds a so-called generative model about the environmental
causes of the sensory inputs it receives. It infers these causes by
making a best guess, or prediction, about incoming inputs at each
point in time and evaluating whether the predicted sensory activ-
ity corresponds with that actually received through the senses. If
not, the system will attempt to reduce this mismatch, or prediction
error, by adjusting its prediction about the state of the environ-
ment and adapting its generative model for the current context
accordingly. Within this scheme, these models are hierarchically
structured (Rohe & Noppeney, 2015;Wacongne et al., 2011), wherehigher levels are capable of capturing patterns in sensory inputs
that have larger spatial or temporal spans.
However, not all prediction errors are created equal. In order to
appropriately weigh a prediction error, not only the mean (best
estimate) is predicted at each level, also the precision (inverse vari-
ance) of the prediction error is estimated. The comparison with a
statistical t-test makes clear why this is important: in a t-test a dif-
ference in means (‘‘prediction error”) is weighted by the variance
or expected (standard) error (Friston, 2010). Otherwise, there is
no way to interpret the importance (informative value) of the dif-
ferences one finds. Technically, precisions are hyper-parameters
which are estimated and learned with the same predictive coding
machinery. Multiple types of uncertainties in the inputs we
receive, make the task of predicting the world particularly chal-
lenging. There may be uncertainty because of our lack of knowl-
edge about a particular regularity in the environment, either
because we have not fully learned the regularity, or because the
regularity has recently changed, which happens frequently in a
volatile environment. Uncertainty can also be due to the proba-
bilistic nature of a given regularity: By chance, an expected input
pattern may not occur. All these types of uncertainties will result
in prediction errors in the system. Unfortunately, we do not know
a priori whether a given prediction error is actually relevant, i.e.,
corresponds to an actual learnable (change in) regularity in the
environment, or not relevant, i.e., is due to probabilistic noise vari-
ability. In the first case the prediction error should be used to
change inferences and learn new structure, but in the second casetp://dx.
2 S. Van de Cruys et al. / Brain and Cognition xxx (2016) xxx–xxxwe should largely ignore it, using it only to improve future preci-
sion estimates. Optimally, precision or gain should be high (Yu &
Dayan, 2005) when prediction errors correspond to reducible,
learnable uncertainty or when confidence in the prediction is low.
In many of the recent proposals for ASD, deficient precision esti-
mation is assumed to be key (Lawson et al., 2014; Palmer, Paton,
Kirkovski, Enticott, & Hohwy, 2015; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Van
de Cruys, de-Wit, Evers, Boets, & Wagemans, 2013; Van de Cruys
et al., 2014). Our own account, termed ‘‘HIPPEA” (for High, Inflex-
ible Precision of Prediction Errors in Autism), assumes that bottom-
up prediction errors are assigned a precision that is too high and
not adapted (inflexible) to the uncertainty in the context (Van de
Cruys et al., 2014). A crucial consequence of this is that prediction
errors are taken at face value, hence there will be too little dis-
counting of (prediction errors stemming from) noise or irrelevant
variability in inputs. Non-repeating, accidental variations in the
input will receive disproportionately high weight, resulting in
overfitting to these irrelevant differences: models will be shaped
by putative regularities that will not generalize. By setting preci-
sion invariably high, ‘‘training examples” will be more literally
encoded (cf. veridical mapping, Mottron et al., 2013). According
to HIPPEA, inefficient predictive updating will result in different
top-down priors or predictions, namely overfitted, low-level ones
that capture too much redundant inputs, and possibly an impover-
ished set of very high level ones that are not sufficiently informa-
tive. Such an incomplete hierarchical generative model would
result from the fact that unduly high precision of inputs induces
predictive matching that takes place on (and might not get
beyond) very local (lower) levels. While this happens at the
expense of detecting more abstract regularities, note that the basic
capacity of forming predictions remains unaffected. Rather, encod-
ing of noise hampers discovery of regularities when these are
embedded in more complex, noisy inputs.
It follows that we should be careful in stating that individuals
with ASD cannot form informative priors (only ‘‘weak” or low pre-
cision priors), as several authors seem to suggest (Manning, Tibber,
Charman, Dakin, & Pellicano, 2015; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Sinha
et al., 2014; Zaidel, Goin-Kochel, & Angelaki, 2015). Surely, in lots
of cases individuals with ASD can detect and learn to use regular-
ities (in the form of informative priors). A recent study by Spanò,
Peterson, Nadel, Rhoads, and Edgin (2015) convincingly showed
that children with ASD use both low-level priors (on convexity
and surface integration) and higher level priors (based on form/
object memories) in a basic visual figure-ground segregation task,
to the same extent as typically developing children. As pointed out
before, even probabilistic and implicit regularities can be learned
in ASD (e.g., Nemeth et al., 2010; Roser, Aslin, McKenzie, Zahra, &
Fiser, 2015; Solomon, Smith, Frank, Ly, & Carter, 2011). If the task
makes clear which stimuli or dimensions are relevant, people with
ASD may even be more sensitive to changes in environmental pat-
terns (Westerfield, Zinni, Vo, & Townsend, 2015) as seen in the P3
ERP component, consistent with our proposal of increased preci-
sion of prediction errors.
Still, there is important commonality between the HIPPEA
account and the weak priors account (Pellicano & Burr, 2012),
because both are talking about relative precisions of bottom-up
and top-down information on each level of the hierarchy (see also
Lawson et al., 2014). The weight of new evidence (and thus the
change in prediction) is defined as the precision of input divided
by the precision of the prior (see Mathys et al., 2014 for the full
computational details). Hence, weaker (i.e., lower precision or less
confidence in) top-down predictions would also lead to increased
reliance on bottom-up information as in the ‘‘weak priors” account
(Pellicano & Burr, 2012). The importance of relative precisions,
however, also implies that studies that find reduced adaptation
in behavior or reduced repetition suppression in fMRI responsesPlease cite this article in press as: Van de Cruys, S., et al. Disentangling signal an
doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2016.08.004in ASD (or high autism traits) (e.g., Ewbank et al., 2014;
Molesworth, Chevallier, Happé, & Hampton, 2015; Turi et al.,
2015) cannot simply be considered evidence for the weaker priors
thesis, even though both adaptation and repetition suppression are
thought to be the result of (top-down) predictive activity (Chopin
& Mamassian, 2012; Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, &
Egner, 2008).
Both ways of shifting the balance in inference (higher bottom-
up precision vs. lower top-down precision) should be dissociable,
at least in principle, when considering the result of inference.
Specifically, one would expect higher precision of the posterior
estimate for ASD in case of higher precision prediction errors. At
first sight, this seems to be a testable prediction, for example by
directly or indirectly probing for decision confidence (Meyniel,
Schlunegger, & Dehaene, 2015; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). Addi-
tionally, one should expect less trial-by-trial fluctuations in confi-
dence according to the current proposal. However, simple
confidence measures may not be able to satisfactorily answer these
questions, given that (1) they provide one measure for something
(posterior) that takes place on multiple hierarchical levels, (2) they
might be affected by (executive) post-perceptual processes, and (3)
they require the capacity to explicitly reflect on one’s own thought
processes (explicit metacognition), which may be particularly defi-
cient in ASD (Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2014).
To make progress on these Bayesian accounts of ASD, it will be
important to study the updating (learning) and application of pri-
ors on a trial-by-trial basis, precisely quantifying varying uncer-
tainties and to what extent they are taken into account for future
inference. In the next section, we will discuss studies in ASD that
are beginning this enterprise, in the context of learning in unstable
or volatile environments. We will see that forming higher order
expectations on volatility are necessary to restrain the effect of
noise.
In a second section, we will look at studies on salience in per-
ception in ASD. Even if priors are learned, they may fail to ade-
quately smooth out the variability that is inherent to all natural
stimuli, because of the weight that deviations receive. This
increased sensitivity to variability, irrespective of its origin or rel-
evance, means that the informative value or salience of different
pieces of input is not properly determined. Again, this can be seen
as an inability to disentangle relevant (signal) and irrelevant
(noise) inputs, dependent on a given context.
In a final section, we will discuss the sensitivity to variability in
the input and how that leads to the lack of robustness in inference.
We will discuss studies that suggest that coherent motion percep-
tion and motor behavior is more vulnerable to noise in ASD. Here
too, second-order estimations of to be expected variability, learned
across different experiences, would typically help rein in noise, but
because of the precision-based mechanism described above this
seems to be hampered in ASD.2. Learning in unstable environments
A mix of uncertainties (actual and accidental changes) is partic-
ularly present in a probabilistic learning task, where the governing
rule (e.g., stimulus A is rewarded) has to be learned based on
imperfect (probabilistic) feedback on your choices, and the govern-
ing rule can change unexpectedly (e.g., not A but B is rewarded
from now on). If one accurately estimates the intrinsic level of
uncertainty across multiple trials (i.e., the expected amount of pre-
diction errors one will encounter), it is easy to weight feedback
that exceeds this expected uncertainty, such that subsequent pre-
dictions about which rule holds, will be updated. Probabilistic
reversal learning studies in ASD participants show that while they
seem perfectly able to learn a probabilistic rule initially,d noise in autism spectrum disorder. Brain and Cognition (2016), http://dx.
S. Van de Cruys et al. / Brain and Cognition xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 3performance is worse relative to neurotypical participants when
the rule needs to be learned and updated in an unstable environ-
ment (D’Cruz et al., 2013; Robic et al., 2015; South, Newton, &
Chamberlain, 2012). More specifically, there are different ways in
which rule updating may be affected by aberrant precision setting,
going from switching too often (when the newest evidence is con-
tinuously weighted too highly), to switching too little (for persis-
tent low weighting of new trials). HIPPEA would predict the
former, however, note that such differences may only become
apparent when variability on an irrelevant dimension is present
(i.e., orthogonal to the dimension of the rule).
Importantly, the type of meta-learning —learning when to learn
and when not to learn— needed for this kind of learning in unstable
environments also concerns a regularity, but one that is integrated
across a longer time scale, namely about what type of variability
can be expected in a given context. There is learnable structure
in the presence of uncertainty as well (Hohwy, 2013), which means
we can learn to expect varying amounts of uncertainty based on
the context. These are estimated as higher order parameters that
are modelled accordingly in a hierarchical Bayesian model (e.g.,
Iglesias et al., 2013; Mathys et al., 2014). They serve as learned
top-down constraints (priors) that seem to be deficient in ASD.
The regularity learned here may be that the conditions (causes)
in this environment alternate frequently. In the experimental set-
ting of reversal learning, this is somewhat contrived and arbitrary,
but in real-life such a regularity may be indicative of different gen-
erative processes (e.g., different intentions of different agents)
behind these alter(n)ations. Hence, being able to dissociate differ-
ent types of uncertainty enables inference of new (higher order)
causes in environment. Note that, apart from these types of explicit
learning tasks, the mismatch negativity signal could also be
exploited to infer the learning of these types of regularities from
the amplitude (gain) of the mismatch responses (for an example
in a typical population, see Todd et al., 2014).3. Salience in context
Natural settings are often even more complex than the environ-
ment of a probabilistic reversal learning task: One is presented
with multiple objects, each with numerous perceptual dimensions,
which can take on a huge range of discriminable values. Which
dimensions or values (features) are relevant is highly dependent
on the context. While a man’s moustache is a relevant piece of
information (signal) when attempting to recognize that face, the
same moustache is far less relevant (noise) when trying to read
the emotional state of the face. Given this ‘‘task” context, i.e., pre-
dictions that are activated (or the top-down questions we ‘‘ask”
from inputs), the weighting of those parts of the input should be
different, such that our inferences are preferentially guided by
the informative or consequential pieces of information. Again, a
certain context will not only elicit certain predictions (after learn-
ing), it will also prepare us with certain expectations on the type of
variability we can expect. These estimations are what should
inform the weights (precision) of prediction errors.
This implies that setting precision has to do with a fallible dis-
missing of certain inputs as noise and highlighting others as rele-
vant, in relation to the current predictions. Hence, noise is not
defined independently of the particular predictive models in ques-
tion (Jost, 2004). It is not an objective quality of input data. Rather,
it is defined as input variability uncorrelated with the prediction or
task at hand. A given datum is relevant, if this datum changes the
inference given the current context. Hence, what will be signal and
what will be noise has to be determined relative to a particular
context and a given level of predictions. Contrary to other propos-
als that focus exclusively on the functional implications of differentPlease cite this article in press as: Van de Cruys, S., et al. Disentangling signal an
doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2016.08.004levels of endogenous noise, caused by physiological processes in
neurons (Davis & Plaisted-Grant, 2015; Simmons et al., 2009), we
draw attention to the fundamental challenge of disentangling sig-
nal from noise or relevant and irrelevant parts of the input.
One could also describe precision-setting in attentional terms.
Particular learned statistical regularities induce an ‘‘attentional
set” (Austen & Enns, 2003; Cosman & Vecera, 2014) characterized
by differential weighting of different inputs. For example, part of
what makes face processing holistic or global, is the high expected
precisions for relevant or diagnostic features, for example the eyes,
at the expense of others. Indeed, Chua, Richler, and Gauthier (2014)
gathered data suggesting ‘‘that holistic (face) processing is an
expression of learned attention to diagnostic face parts.” At the
same time, it is an expectation on the features that can vary and
to what extent, without being consequential for the task at hand
(cf. generalization). For instance, precise details of a font do not
matter (are expected to vary) for the task of reading the text, but
they might matter for a different task on the same inputs. This
highlights the link between precision setting and a global versus
local processing style. Global processing is a learned attentional
strategy —by precision setting— to focus attention to those differ-
ences in the input that could answer ‘‘questions” (predictions)
from a particular (high) level of processing. Hence, it is about using
a spatial configuration (a predictable structure) to efficiently sam-
ple informative parts and eliminating non-diagnostic information.
This is nicely illustrated in heat maps of eye movements, show-
ing how people ‘‘forage” information in object-specific trajectories
(Yang, Lengyel, & Wolpert, 2016). Friston, Adams, Perrinet, and
Breakspear (2012) model these saccades based on expected preci-
sions, given certain predictive models (e.g., for the presence of a
face). Given the task of discriminating a face (from a non-face or
inverted face), eye movements visit certain regions of the input
that have the highest expected precision, meaning they have the
most discriminative power to reduce uncertainty about the input.
In light of the role of expected precisions in deciding where to look,
it is clear why studies in ASD often report aberrant, more variable
saccade patterns compared to those of typical participants, for
example for faces (Boraston & Blakemore, 2007; Pelphrey et al.,
2002). However, in line with the current view, this atypical sal-
ience estimation is not limited to faces or other social stimuli.
Wang et al. (2015) recently demonstrated that saccade hot spots
(across various natural images), were more determined by low-
level salience (e.g., contrast) in ASD than semantic-level salience
as was the case for typically developing individuals.
Note that people with ASD seem perfectly able to assign sal-
ience, when explicitly guided by top-down knowledge. This is sup-
ported by their intact or superior visual search performance for
simple displays (Gliga, Bedford, Charman, Johnson, & BASIS Team,
2015). Here, the relevant feature (‘‘signal”) is known in advance
and does not need to be autonomously determined, based on
extensive learning. It actually pays off to amplify the odd one out
in this task. However, as a recent study by Keehn and Joseph
(2016) pointed out, when the target is not known in advance peo-
ple with ASD lose their advantage and actually performworse, con-
sistent with the current conception.4. Robustness in perception and action
Appropriate precision-estimation not only provides salience,
but also robustness to perception and action by suppressing noise
or irrelevant variation. This may directly link to frequent reports of
increased interindividual and intraindividual heterogeneity in neu-
ral and behavioral measures in ASD (e.g., Hahamy, Behrmann, &
Malach, 2015; Haigh, Heeger, Dinstein, Minshew, & Behrmann,
2015). Again, the expectation about the variability itself needs tod noise in autism spectrum disorder. Brain and Cognition (2016), http://dx.
1 Given recent evidence for deficient interoception in ASD (e.g., Garfinkel et al.,
2016), future research will need to figure out whether generally poorer (low expected
precision) vestibular perception could help explain these findings.
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proper learning and reshaping of priors. In a meticulous individual-
level study on micro-movements, Torres et al. (2013) showed that,
in action as well, subjects with ASD did not properly learn about
the variability or unreliability intrinsic in their own motions, mak-
ing their micro-movements more random or ‘‘memory-less”. Even
though they were able to perform according to the goals of the
motor task, Brincker and Torres (2013, p. 2) observed that ‘‘the
movement variability from experiencing the ‘‘here and now”
seemed to be the only useful kinesthetic information to them”.
Coherent motion (CM) has been frequently used to study
robustness in perception, including many studies in ASD. Most
CM studies use random dot kinematograms (RDKs), for which par-
ticipants are required to discriminate the overall dominant motion
direction of a field of dots, while a certain percentage of the dots
moves randomly across the display. However, rather than being a
direct test for global processing capacities, as frequently thought,
CM tasks actually confound the capacity to integrate local inputs
into global percepts with one’s sensitivity to noise (Dakin,
Mareschal, & Bex, 2005; Manning, Dakin, Tibber, & Pellicano,
2014). While RDK performance in ASD is predominantly inter-
preted in relation to possible global integration deficits (or weak
central coherence), the results could also be interpreted in terms
of the participants’ ability to cope with noise inherently present
in the displays. Interestingly, studies with noiseless motion para-
digms (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Foss-Feig, Tadin, Schauder, &
Cascio, 2013) have shown intact global motion perception in ASD.
In an exciting recent study, Manning et al. (2015) present data
that speak directly to this issue by investigating the sensitivity to
directional differences in motion display in children with and
without ASD (matched on age and IQ). Children completed a
direction integration task with two interleaved conditions (no-
variability and high-variability) in addition to a traditional motion
coherence task. In the direction integration task, dot directions
were sampled from a normal distribution with a specified mean
and standard deviation (SD). In the no-variability condition, the
SD of dot directions was 0 and the mean direction of dots varied
in order to find the finest direction discrimination possible. In
the high-variability condition, the mean direction of dots was
fixed but the SD of dot directions was varied to find the maximum
level of variability that could be tolerated while successfully
identifying the signal direction. In the motion coherence task, a
proportion of dots moved in a coherent direction, while the
remaining dots moved in random directions. The authors used
an adaptive staircase method in all three tasks to estimate
thresholds.
Manning et al. (2015) found that children with ASD, compared
to the typically developing children, were as sensitive to direc-
tional differences when all elements moved in the same direction
(no-variability). Crucially, the children with ASD proved more
sensitive to the average direction in the presence of directional
variability (high-variability) than the typically developing children.
Despite the improved averaging ability, however, the children with
ASD performed comparably to typical children in the standard
motion coherence task. Manning et al. (2015) drew two main con-
clusions from these data. Firstly, children with ASD outperformed
typically developing children in the high-variability motion direc-
tion task, suggesting enhanced integration of local motion in ASD.
Several other studies have also indicated that individuals with ASD
can process global spatial information at least as well as typical
controls (e.g., in contour integration, Almeida, Dickinson,
Maybery, Badcock, & Badcock, 2014; or in contextual cueing stud-
ies, Barnes et al., 2008). Taken together, these results present a
major challenge for any account of ASD proposing a core deficiency
of global, integrative processing of perceptual inputs (e.g., ‘‘weak
central coherence”; Happé & Frith, 2006).Please cite this article in press as: Van de Cruys, S., et al. Disentangling signal an
doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2016.08.004Secondly, Manning et al. propose that ASD is characterized by
reduced segregation of signal from noise in motion signals, as the
CM performance did not benefit from the enhanced motion inte-
gration demonstrated in the direction discrimination task. Hence,
the study by Manning et al. is particularly revealing in its direct
comparison of these two global motion paradigms.
Although the CM findings of Manning et al. support the hypoth-
esis that individuals with ASD have problems in dealing with noise,
their additional analyses suggest that these problems cannot be
attributed to different levels of endogenous noise in the perceptual
system, contrary to theories of ASD that argue for higher (Simmons
et al., 2009) or lower (Davis & Plaisted-Grant, 2015) internal noise
as core deficit. Hence, an alternative explanation based on the
(inadequate) weighting of different local inputs, seems more
attractive. In the high-variability direction discrimination task, all
variability in the dot cloud is informative, so all dots are signal dots
that can and should be weighted indiscriminately in order to make
a decision on the (average) motion direction. Crucially, while the
high-variability discrimination stands to gain from uniform, indis-
criminate weighting of all dot directions (to estimate the mean),
the no-variability would not gain (or lose) from this, consistent
with their findings in ASD. In other words, the increased sensitivity
to variability in ASD will not hurt performance in this task (because
it is relevant). Finally, in the motion coherence task, signal dots
should be weighted more strongly compared to randomly moving
(noise) dots, which should be ignored as much as possible, hence
differential weights are essential.
Remarkably, converging evidence was recently provided by
Zaidel et al. (2015), using a paradigm in which participants had
to discern the direction of simulated self-motion through random
dot clouds (optic flow). Specifically, adolescents with ASD were
slightly better for the condition in which 100% of dots moved in
a coherent way, while their performance was disproportionately
negatively affected when a proportion of dots moved randomly
(noise), producing higher thresholds than controls. Zaidel et al. also
included a vestibular cue that could be used (with lower reliability)
to detect self-motion direction, and found that multisensory inte-
gration was intact in ASD, despite their increased sensitivity to
visual noise. Most interestingly, subjects also performed several
consecutive blocks of the task in the 0% coherence condition (com-
plete visual noise), allowing the authors to study whether partici-
pants could actually learn to ignore the (uninformative) visual cue
and rely only on the vestibular cue. While control participants
quickly learned to down-weight the visual noise to perform more
optimally, performance of individuals with ASD remained the same
across blocks, showing that they were not flexible in the weighting
of visual inputs.1 Together, these CM studies suggest that individu-
als with ASD have problems in giving appropriate, differential
weight to inputs in conditions of uncertainty (noise).5. Conclusions
With these three examples above, we have argued that the real
challenge of disentangling signal and noise in ASD lies in forming
higher-order expectations about the type and quantity of variabil-
ity that one should expect in given context, based on multiple
experiences or trials on a longer timescale, not just single
instances. In those cases, prior information should also be learned
and used inefficiently, as findings by Skewes, Jegindø, and Gebauer
(2014) suggest. However, extracting a mean estimate for a single
display (e.g., contrast detection, average motion discrimination,d noise in autism spectrum disorder. Brain and Cognition (2016), http://dx.
S. Van de Cruys et al. / Brain and Cognition xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5or numerosity estimation) should not pose a problem in ASD when
the display does not include noise that should be weighted differ-
ently than the rest of the input, nor will learning a prior cause dif-
ficulties in such conditions. Hence, a viable hypothesis seems to be
that individuals with ASD weigh inputs higher and indiscrimi-
nately, which leads to problems in certain settings, illustrated
above, but not in others. Taking full advantage of the quantifying
potential and nuance of Bayesian frameworks, future studies will
need to bear out whether predictive capacities in ASD are indeed
affected in this way.
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